Large Retail Time Deposits and U.S. Treasury Securities (1986 S S95): Evidence of a Segmenting Market
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Introduction
Despite an ever-growing menu of options offering diverse risk and return possibilities, investors continue to place a large volume of funds in fixed-rate, fixed-maturity, default risk free instruments. These take two forms: purchases of U.S. Treasury securities and placement of funds in FDIC-insured large retail certificates of deposit (hereinafter Treasuries and large time deposits, or large CDs.) At the end of the first quarter of 1996, $3,375 billion in marketable Treasuries were outstanding, with 10.3 percent of these held by individuals. At 1 that time, investors also held $578 billion in large and small retail time deposits at commercial banks and $355 billion at thrift institutions (balances of $100,000 or less.) 2 Because large CDs and Treasuries offer similar cash flow patterns and risks, they should be closely priced in an efficient market (i.e., their yields should be closely related to one another.) Any differences in their yields should be small relative to differences in yield with other securities (such as corporate bonds or equities) and should be explained by contractual features and market structures. To our knowledge, however, these two securities have not been compared from an investor's point of view.
Our study fills this gap in the literature by comparing published yields on large retail CDs with balances between $90,000 and 100,000 and maturity-matched Treasury yields. This pairing enables us to avoid three fundamental problems encountered in deposit pricing studies.
First, obtaining information on deposit pricing is difficult. The primary source of information about banks' balance sheets S the call report S does not include information on deposit pricing.
The Federal Reserve Bulletin's monthly survey of deposit yields lumps deposits into maturity buckets and the mix of products on which it reports has changed substantially over the years.
2 Second, retail bank deposits provide investors with a number of nonmonetary returns for which yield equivalences are difficult to determine. These include low minimum balance requirements, reduced fees on transactions services, and low-cost, easy acquisition through systems of local branch offices. No close investment substitutes exist for these products, making yield comparisons impossible. Third, wholesale or jumbo bank deposits (minimum > $100,000), for which nonmonetary returns are insignificant, are at risk of default. Default expectations will be reflected in their yields, making direct comparisons to risk free securities, such as Treasuries, inappropriate. The $90,000 minimum we study weakens the impact of bank deposits' non-monetary returns on stated yields, while the maximum of $100,000 negates the default issue by ensuring a federal "full faith and credit" guarantee, like that for Treasury securities.
Our purpose is to test the hypothesis that the yields in the large time deposit market and the Treasury market are equivalent and that price differences between CDs and Treasuries can be explained by differences in contractual and market features. During the early part of the period studied, our results are in line with this hypothesis. That is, large CD yields fluctuated around Treasury yields and the average spreads could be explained by differences in required minimum investments. However, beginning in mid-1990, large deposit yields uniformly dropped and stayed below Treasury yields. This change does not appear to have affected aggregate investment in large deposits.
Our study also extends the work of Mahoney, White, O'Brien, and McLaughlin (1987) , who document changing deposit yields for the two years following deposit deregulation. We find that deposit yields can be well represented as smoothed Treasury yields. In addition, we find support for the hypothesis that average large time CDs exhibited upward stickiness with respect to Treasury yields.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses deposit pricing and its historical relation to Treasury yields. Section 3 describes the similarities and principal differences between investment in Treasuries and insured large deposits. Section 4 describes See Mahoney, et al (1987) , charts 1-4. 3 During the Regulation Q era, banks also provided explicit goods (such as the infamous toaster or electric 4 blanket) as a reward for deposits, a practice that has essentially disappeared post-deregulation. See Davis, R. G. and 3 the data we studied. Section 5 describes the results of our analysis, and Section 6 summarizes these results and presents our conclusions.
Deposit Pricing
This paper is most closely related to the work of Mahoney et al. (1987) , who studied retail deposit pricing during the two years immediately following its deregulation, November 1983 through December 1985. Our study begins in June 1986. Thus our findings can be viewed as an extension of theirs, albeit with some important differences. Although Mahoney et al. focused on comparing commercial bank and thrift institution deposit pricing (and pointing to historical differences in regulations), they also report a negative average depositTreasury spread over the period they studied. It is unsurprising that negative spreads are found for small minimum balance accounts, because an investor with $1,000 in a CD had little incentive to chase 50 basis points in additional return, particularly when her bank offered free checking and other benefits. Also, time deposit yields were legally constrained below Treasury yields until October 1983. Mahoney et al.'s data show that banks closed these wide negative yield spreads within the first year of deregulation and that yields on deposits moved with or above Treasury yields throughout 1985. 3 Possible disparities between retail deposits and Treasuries are examined in studies about deposit pricing from the issuer's (bank's) point of view. Flannery (1982) developed and found some evidence supporting the hypothesis that banks can reasonably pay a premium for consumer (retail) deposits in order to maintain a core liability, relying on less expensive wholesale funds at the margin. However, he also noted that rates are not the only means by which banks offer value to depositors; they can also offer such benefits as favorable branch locations and ease of reinvestment. Thus the monetary and time costs of moving deposits, 4 4 called switching costs, may cause investors to accept lower yields than those earned from comparable securities. Heffernan [1992] subsequently developed specific interest-rate equivalences for non-rate components based on a small sample of British banks. These papers suggest that investors will accept yields lower than those on Treasuries to the extent that they receive nonmonetary value from time deposits, but will require higher yields when Treasuries offer net advantages.
A commonly held paradigm says that time deposit yields follow current and past Treasury yields, but they respond slowly and asymmetrically to movements in the Treasury market. The notion that large CD yields respond to changes in Treasury yields slowly is referred to as deposit yield smoothing. The idea that they fall at a different speed when Treasury yields fall than they rise when Treasury yields rise is referred to as deposit yield (price) stickiness. Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) studied these phenomena in markets of varying concentration and found that deposit yields were quicker to fall and slower to rise in markets with fewer issuers (banks). In related work, Cooperman, Lee and Lesage (1991) studied the extent to which a national market was developing for deposits and found that co-integration was increasing over time, at least among banks in the largest U.S. cities.
While our study is related to these papers, it differs in that we have a demand perspective (i.e., that of individual investors). Specifically, where Flannery compared two substitutes for bank funding, retail and wholesale deposits, we compare two close substitutes for consumer investment, insured large CDs and U.S. Treasuries.
In an unique paper, Jackson and Aber (1992) found that investor perceptions can affect deposit levels more than relative pricing. They measured the impact on deposit balances of the frequency with which banks changed their deposit yields and the closeness of those changes to changes in market interest yields. They found that banks that changed their yields frequently Duffee (1996) describes changes in the relationships between Treasury security prices (yields) and other money 5 market instruments over the period 1959 through 1994.
All information regarding the Treasury Direct program is taken from Buying Treasury Securities at Federal
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Reserve Banks, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 16th edition, 1993. The noncompetitive bid price (yield) for a particular auction is the value-weighted average of the winning competitive bids.
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and randomly attracted more deposits than those that followed changes in market yields slowly and closely.
3. Large Retail Time Deposits and Treasury Securities as Close Substitutes. Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Ellis and Flannery (1992) explore the existence of bank-specific default premiums in wholesale time deposit yields. Their work implicitly claims that bank time deposit yields are most appropriately compared with those of matched-maturity U.S. Treasuries. Similarly, our analysis is based on the premise that large, FDIC-insured 5 time deposits and U.S. Treasury securities are very close substitutes from an investor's point of view. If this is true, it follows that they should be similarly priced (provide the same yield) in an efficient market. Thus, it is useful to review the primary differences between bank time deposits and U.S. Treasury securities and to acknowledge the yield disparities that these differences could potentially imply. Table 1 provides a summary of the discussion that follows. We assume throughout this discussion that Treasury securities are purchased using noncompetitive bids through the Treasury Direct program. Both securities offer the default protection of a federal "full faith and credit" guarantee; thus, the default risk premium for both should be identical and close to zero. Retail time deposits with maturities of one year or less are zero-coupon securities, as are Treasury bills.
Five-year Treasury notes pay interest semiannually, while the coupon frequency of time deposits of this maturity varies across issuers, with quarterly payments more typical. This variety of payment frequencies might provide a small advantage to time deposits, allowing slightly lower yields.
The minimum order for T-bills is $10,000. It is $5,000 for two-and three-year Tnotes, and $1,000 for longer maturities, with increments of $1,000 available over the minimums for all maturities. As noted previously, the yields that we examine are for CDs and Treasuries are among the most universally accepted forms of collateral. It is quite easy, though costly, for an investor faced with an unexpected liquidity need to obtain a loan on very favorable terms, pledging either an insured time deposit or a Treasury security as collateral.
On 04/22/97, the commission for trading any volume of Treasury securities through Charles Schwab, a 8 discount broker, was $49, or 5.4 basis points for $90,000 in Treasuries.
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Finally, time deposits can be created during any business day with no explicit monetary fee. Treasuries can be purchased without fee using noncompetitive bids through the Treasury Department or any of the regional Federal Reserve Banks (FRBs) using the Treasury Direct program. However, noncompetitive bids must be received prior to the auction and be accompanied by full payment for the face value of the securities desired, suggesting a loss of interest income, though one that can be minimized by sending orders close to the auction date.
Placing bids through a brokerage avoids this lost interest, but adds a commission cost. Even so, this fee is generally low S on the order of 5 basis points. The amount of this commission 
The Data.
The CD yield series examined in this paper were gathered from the survey of effective annual yields conducted by the Banxquote division of Masterfund, Inc. This national survey of 100 large commercial banks is conducted each week and published in the Wall Street
Journal the following day under the title "Banxquote Money Markets." Average effective ® annual yields for eight maturities and two minimum deposits levels are provided. We gathered yields for fixed rate deposits with a minimum balance of $90,000 and maturities of three months, one year, and five years. Although we also gathered and analyzed the yields for deposits with minimum balances of $500, those results are only briefly summarized in order to
Because of the arcane way that T-bill yields are reported, the three-month and one-year ask rates used herein 9 are systematically less than the effective yield an investor would earn. Thus, the chance of finding a negative deposit-Treasury yield spread is understated. The five-year Treasury yields and all of the time deposit yields are true annual yields.
9 concentrate on the clearer evidence provided by the larger balance sample. Yields for these large deposits were first available on June 26, 1986, while those of smaller deposits were first published on January 6, 1986. They were collected through the last week of 1995, providing almost ten years of homogenous data.
U.S. Treasury yields were gathered from the "Treasury Bonds, Notes, and Bills" 
Analysis.
The core purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between yields on large balance, fully insured, bank-originated time deposits and those of U.S. Treasury securities.
We first summarize the size of time deposit-Treasury yield spreads over our full sample period and a selection of subperiods. Next, we see how closely, and at what lags, large CD yields tracked Treasury yields, as evidence that direct comparison of these yields is warranted. We then test for upward yield stickiness, as a measure of relative supply-side power in the CD
market. Finally, we analyze the effects of changes in large CD yields and CD-Treasury yield spreads on changes in aggregate CD balances, in order to determine the extent to which investors responded to the widening negative spreads. This visual evidence clearly indicates that Treasury yields exhibit the most volatility, followed by large-retail and then small-retail CD yields, which suggests that CD yields are less subject to market forces than Treasury yields. Summary statistics for three subperiods, 1986-89, 1990-92, and 1993-95 , are provided in panels a through c of table 3. During the first subperiod, CD yields remained close to those offered by Treasuries, with small retail yields averaging slightly less and large retail yields slightly more. These relationships make sense because the conditions on small retail CDs are less limiting, particularly with respect to minimum balances, than those on large retail CDs. The yield volatilities seen during this subperiod conform to expectations: Treasuries are most volatile, followed by large and then small retail CDs. During the second subperiod, the average small retail-Treasury spread became more negative, and the average large retail-Treasury spread became negative. The volatilities exhibited by each yield series for a given maturity were roughly the same. During the third subperiod, both negative CD-Treasury spreads widened further, and the volatilities resumed their expected relationship. Chart 2 also provides visual evidence of the changing relationship between Treasury and CD yields (for the one-year maturity). The first panel shows the Treasury yield over time. The second shows the large retail-Treasury spread, while the third shows the small retail-Treasury spread.
The relationship between Treasury and Deposit Yields.
CD Yields as Smoothed Treasury Yields.
Movements in the yields of large retail CDs continued to closely mimic those of Treasuries, despite the widening negative spread of CDs to Treasuries. Bankers acknowledge that they are sometimes slow to respond to changes in market interest rates, waiting to see what the longer-term trend will be. If this "smoothing" exists, it would account for the lower volatility in CD yields over some periods relative to Treasury yields. To measure the similarities between CD and Treasury yield changes, we performed the following regression for each of the three maturities.
( 1) where )CD is the weekly percentage change in the large retail CD yield, )T is the weekly percentage change in the same maturity Treasury yield, and ((L) is the lag function. We P-values provided in ()'s below parameter estimates. Coefficient estimates in bold are significant at the 5% level, two-sided test.
Contemporaneous changes in the Treasury yield, as well as the first four lagged changes, have a significant effect on changes in CD yields for each of the three maturities.
The results suggest that the one-month cumulative effect of a 1 percent increase in the fourth have no significant impact on CD yields (other than the eleventh for reasons we cannot explain beyond "Type II" error) and the constant term, ", is negative and insignificant for all maturities. In summary, this analysis confirms that CD yields can be reasonably thought to follow those of Treasuries.
Supply Side Power: Upward CD Yield Stickiness.
To say that a particular yield is sticky is to say that it responds to movements in some market or reference yield asymmetrically. If the reaction of the yield to an increase in the reference yield is less substantial than its reaction to a decrease in the reference yield, the yield is said to be "upward sticky." If the reaction is more substantial, the yield is said to be "downward sticky." Evidence of upward deposit yield stickiness was found in some markets by previous researchers (e.g., Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) ). If such asymmetric yield reactions are indicated by our national sample, it suggests that every market for large retail CDs may be characterized by a form of supply-side power (or, equivalently, demand-side weakness.) In other words, such a finding would suggest that banks in the aggregate have demonstrated the ability to control relative deposit yields to their advantage (i.e., lowering yields quickly and raising them slowly), while investors in the aggregate have shown themselves to be somewhat yield insensitive.
As shown in the previous section, Treasuries provide a good reference yield for large CDs, because changes in CD yields mimic those of Treasuries, though with some substantial lags. Intuitively, then, we want to find evidence such as "for each 10 bps that Treasury yields rise, CD yields rise 5 bps, but for each 10 bps that Treasury yields fall, CD yields fall 8 basis points," which would suggest that CD yields are upward sticky with respect to Treasury yields. Our approach is to separate the full sample into two parts. One part includes all weeks during which the Treasury yield was increasing; the other part includes the remaining weeks (during which were Treasury yields were decreasing or remained constant.) We re-estimate equation (1) for each subsample and compare parameter estimates across the two regressions.
The fifth lag is included in the one-week split, three-month maturity and four-week split, one-year maturity tests 11 because the p-value of its slope estimate was very close to the 5% cutoff for one of the subsamples.
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If the slope parameters for the "treasury decreases" subsample are larger than those for the "treasury increases" subsample, the upward stickiness hypothesis is supported.
However, the lagged relationship between CD and Treasury yields complicates matters as follows. Suppose the Treasury yield increased by a small amount over week t, but had decreased substantially during the previous weeks (weeks t-1, t-2, etc.) According to the full sample slope parameter estimates for equation (1), which are summarized in table 4, the CD yield would be expected to have decreased during week t, even though the Treasury yield had increased contemporaneously. The question is whether week t should then be included in the "treasury increased" or "treasury decreased" subsamples. The Treasury yield may have increased during the week, but its trend (and its effect on CD yields) is clearly a decrease.
This translates into a question of how to split the full sample. We chose to split it according to the cumulative change in Treasury yield over the last n weeks. The cumulative change over n weeks is equal to the Treasury yield at week t less the Treasury yield at week tn. Because there is no common understanding about how long the Treasury yield must trend in a particular direction in order to cause an asymmetric reaction in CD yields, we ran this test three times; for n equal to one week, four weeks (. one month), and twelve weeks (. one quarter). Equation (1) was re-estimated for each subsample, for the number of lags in the Treasury yield changes that significantly helped to explain changes in the CD yield. The 11 results of this analysis are provided in Tables 5a-c. Each table provides a side-by-side comparison of the paired regressions for each of the three maturities. In each of the nine paired regressions, the slope on the contemporaneous change in the Treasury yield (t=0) was larger for the "treasury decreased" subsample. In eight of nine cases, the slope on the first lag (t=-1) was also larger (the exception is the three-month yield using the four week split.) For this test, the sample of weekly changes in the CD yields was split into two parts, based on whether the Treasury yield for the week was higher or lower than the yield from the previous week. These are referred to as the "treasury increased" and "treasury decreased" subsamples. Equation (1) was estimated using each subsample of the data set. The parameter estimates from each estimation were compared using a standard Chow test and the results of the full sample (constrained) regression. The number of lags in the full sample regression is equal to maximum significant lags for either subsample (unconstrained) regression. For this test, the sample of weekly changes in the CD yields was split into two parts, based on whether the Treasury yield for the week was higher or lower than the yield from four weeks before. (This is equivalent to asking whether the cumulative four-week change in the Treasury yield was positive or negative.) These are referred to as the "treasury increased" and "treasury decreased" subsamples. Equation (1) was estimated using each subsample of the data set. The parameter estimates from each estimation were compared using a standard Chow test and the results of the full sample (constrained) regression. The number of lags in the full sample regression is equal to maximum significant lags for either subsample (unconstrained) regression. For this test, the sample of weekly changes in the CD yields was split into two parts, based on whether the Treasury yield for the week was higher or lower than the yield from twelve weeks before. (This is equivalent to asking whether the cumulative 12-week change in the Treasury yield was positive or negative.) These are referred to as the "treasury increased" and "treasury decreased" subsamples. Equation (1) was estimated using each subsample of the data set. The parameter estimates from each estimation were compared using a standard Chow test and the results of the full sample (constrained) regression. The number of lags in the full sample regression is equal to maximum significant lags for either subsample (unconstrained) regression. Of particular interest is the sum of the slope coefficients (3$'s.) In each paired regression, the sum of the betas for the "treasury decreased" regression is larger. This means that, when the one-, four-or twelve-week trend in the Treasury yield is a decreasing one (when market interest rates are generally declining), large CD yields react more quickly to a change in Treasury yields than when the trend is an increasing one. In other words, the evidence suggests that large retail CD yields are upward sticky.
3-month CDs 1-year CDs 5-year CDs
As a test of the significance of these differences, we employed the "Chow" test described in section 5.4 of Kennedy (1985) . A significant "Chow" statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates from two unconstrained regressions, each employing the same model but using different data, are the same. For the one-week or twelve-week subsamples, the "Chow" statistic is significant for all maturities, suggesting that the aggregate 24 differences in the slopes are significant (i.e., that CD yields are significantly upward sticky.)
The "Chow" statistic was insignificant for any maturity using the four-week subsamples. t=-2 3.00 E-5 9.74 E-7 1.72 E-6 t=-3 0.43 E-5 0.15 E-7 1.37 E-6 t=-4 2.80 E-5 4.77 E-7 2.08 E-6 t=-5 3.16 E-5 3.80 E-7 1.29 E-6 System R 0.6809 0.7154 0.6580 2 Coefficient estimates in bold are significant at the 5% level, two-sided test.
Changes in
For no maturity did lagged changes in the yield spread have a significant impact on changes in the aggregate CD balance. On the other hand, changes in the same maturity Treasury yield had a strong impact on retail CD balances. The results suggest that a change in the Treasury yield began to affect investors' decisions to purchase retail CDs two to three months after it occurred and continued to have an impact over an additional eight to ten months. The evidence strongly suggests that CD balances rose and fell with the general level of interest rates (as proxied by the Treasury yield), but that investors ignored the (widening) spread between the two substitutes.
Concluding Remarks
Positing that U.S. Treasury securities represent very close investment substitutes for large-balance, fully insured time deposits, we have shown that large-CD-Treasury yieldspreads moved from small and positive to large and negative over the period 1986-95, without a measurable reaction in deposit balances. This lack of an inverse price-quantity relationship cannot be explained by differences between the securities; indeed, the differences between large CDs and Treasuries, particularly in tax treatment and liquidity, generally favor
Treasuries, implying that a spread in favor of Treasuries should exist. While a negative spread for small retail deposits could be due to banks providing value to depositors that is unrelated to interest rates, nothing in the literature or in basic price theory explains investors' willingness to accept yields significantly below comparable-maturity Treasuries for time deposits of $90,000
to $100,000. This difference was on the order of 50 basis points during 1993-95, or the equivalent of more than $1,600 per $100,000 over this period, compounded annually.
Our explanation is that continued investor migration from insured CDs into higher- any day/amount fixed auction Treasuries > CDs schedule / $1,000 increments.
The discussion summarized in the table above compares bank-originated, FDIC-insured time deposits requiring balances between $90,000 and 100,000 with U.S. Treasury Securities acquired using noncompetitive bids through the Treasury Direct program. P-values provided in ()'s below parameter estimates. Coefficient estimates in bold are significant at the 5% level, two-sided test. For this test, the sample of weekly changes in the CD yields was split into two parts, based on whether the Treasury yield for the week was higher or lower than the yield from the previous week. These are referred to as the "treasury increased" and "treasury decreased" subsamples. Equation (1) was estimated using each subsample of the data set. The parameter estimates from each estimation were compared using a standard Chow test and the results of the full sample (constrained) regression. The number of lags in the full sample regression is equal to maximum significant lags for either subsample (unconstrained) regression. For this test, the sample of weekly changes in the CD yields was split into two parts, based on whether the Treasury yield for the week was higher or lower than the yield from four weeks before. (This is equivalent to asking whether the cumulative four-week change in the Treasury yield was positive or negative.) These are referred to as the "treasury increased" and "treasury decreased" subsamples. Equation (1) was estimated using each subsample of the data set. The parameter estimates from each estimation were compared using a standard Chow test and the results of the full sample (constrained) regression. The number of lags in the full sample regression is equal to maximum significant lags for either subsample (unconstrained) regression. For this test, the sample of weekly changes in the CD yields was split into two parts, based on whether the Treasury yield for the week was higher or lower than the yield from twelve weeks before. (This is equivalent to asking whether the cumulative 12-week change in the Treasury yield was positive or negative.) These are referred to as the "treasury increased" and "treasury decreased" subsamples. Equation (1) was estimated using each subsample of the data set. The parameter estimates from each estimation were compared using a standard Chow test and the results of the full sample (constrained) regression. The number of lags in the full sample regression is equal to maximum significant lags for either subsample (unconstrained) regression. 
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